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 Surety/real party in interest/appellant Judy Luis (hereinafter “Appellant”), hereby submits 
her Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Respondent (hereinafter “Respondent’s Brief) filed 
March 14, 2018, by respondent State of Idaho (hereinafter “Respondent”).  Based on the 
arguments made in Appellant’s Brief and below, errors were committed by the District Court and 
the Magistrate Court in mid-December 2016. 
 Had the applicable statutes and rules been properly followed by the District Court and 
Magistrate Court, the subject bond monies posted by Appellant on behalf of Dillon Grant Gibson, 
specifically the $50,000.00 cash bond amount, would have been revoked, exonerated, and returned 
to Appellant on or around December 14, 2016, after Mr. Gibson was remanded to the custody of 
the Bingham County Sheriff’s Office for violation of the conditions of his release on bail.  The 
subject bond monies, specifically the $50,000.00 cash bond amount at issue in this appeal, would 
have never “remain[ed]on deposit at the time of the judgment” (IDAHO CODE § 19-2908); the 
January 12, 2017, Judgment of Conviction – Order of Commitment for Mr. Gibson (R, pp. 220-
223).  IDAHO CODE § 19-2908 would not have been discussed as applicable in this matter because 
there would have been no cash bond monies with Bingham County1 to begin paying the fees, fines, 
costs, and restitution ordered against Mr. Gibson. 
 Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s August 9, 2017, 
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money and remand this matter back to 
                                                 
1 It is unsure how the bond monies (whether it be cash bond, property bond, or surety bond) are held by Bingham 
County once they are paid on behalf of a Defendant.  For ease of reference the term “Bingham County” will be used 
in this Reply Brief to refer to the holder of the bond monies at issue in this matter. 
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the District Court with instructions: 1) to revoke and exonerate the $50,000.00 cash bond amount 
posted by Appellant pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2912, 19-2919(1)-(2), 19-2922(6), and I.C.R. 
46(i) (2016 version); and 2) to return said monies back to Appellant as should have been done on 
or about December 14, 2016.  Appellant also respectfully requests that this Court award her 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs related to this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
 For the convenience of the Court, the arguments in this Reply Brief will be made in the 
same order as made in Respondent’s Brief. 
I. Errors by the Magistrate Court and District Court Have Been Shown by Appellant and 
the Cash Bond Monies Should Be Revoked and Exonerated, Not Applied to the Court Costs, 
Fines, and Restitution. 
 
A. Introduction. 
 In the second paragraph of p. 4 in Respondent’s Brief, Respondent incorrectly recites facts 
that the Magistrate Court “remanded [Mr. Gibson] to the custody of the sheriff, ordered that the 
bonds not be revoked and imposed a condition of posting another $100,000 as a condition of 
further release.  (Tr., p. 48, L. 18-p. 49, L. 15.)”. 
 First, while the Magistrate Court did remand Mr. Gibson to the custody of the Bingham 
County Sheriff’s Office on December 14, 2016, (R, p. 192), the Magistrate Court did not “order[] 
that the bonds not be revoked”.  Respondent’s Brief, p. 4.  The Magistrate Court instead advised 
Mr. Gibson that “it (the $100,000.00 bond amount added by the District Court through Bench 
Warrant 1, R, p. 191) does not forfeit” the $240,000.00 bond already posted by Appellant.  See 
Tr, p. 3 (parenthesis added); see also R, p. 192.  The term “forfeit” is an incorrect term to use 
3 
when it comes to how bond monies are treated and processed when a Defendant violates the 
conditions of his release on bail. 
 “‘Forfeiture’ means an order of the court reciting that the defendant failed to appear as 
ordered and stating that bail is forfeited.”  IDAHO CODE § 19-2905(9).  At no time in this 
matter did Mr. Gibson fail to appear as ordered for any hearing or other proceeding which 
would “forfeit” the bond monies posted by Appellant.  Further, “forfeiture” of the bond 
monies for failing to appear is governed by IDAHO CODE § 19-2915; which statute is not at 
issue in this matter because Mr. Gibson violated the conditions of his release on bail which is 
governed by IDAHO CODE § 19-2919. 
 As argued in Appellant’s Brief, the Magistrate Court should have ordered that the bond 
monies be revoked when it remanded Mr. Gibson to the custody of the Bingham County Sheriff’s 
Office after he violated the conditions of his release on bail.  For the Magistrate Court to not 
revoke the bond monies under § 19-2919(1) was error.  See Appellant’s Brief, Part E, pp. 25-26. 
 Second, the Magistrate Court did not “impose[] a condition of posting another $100,000 as 
a condition of further release.”  Respondent’s Brief, p. 4.  The Magistrate Court instead advised 
Mr. Gibson that the bond amount of $100,000.00 was “in addition to the previously posed bond”.  
See R, p. 192; see also Tr, p. 3.  This $100,000.00 increase of Mr. Gibson’s bail was set by the 
District Court when issuing the Bench Warrant.  See R, p. 191 (Bench Warrant 1); see also 
Statements of Fact 12, 13, and 15 in Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6. 
 As argued in Appellant’s Brief at Part D, pp. 23-24, it was also error to not exonerate the 
already posted bond monies when the District Court increased the bail amount from $240,000.00 
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to $340,000.00.  Bingham County, whether through the District Court Clerk’s Office or however 
the bond monies are held once paid on behalf of a Defendant, cannot continue to hold onto what 
now becomes a partial payment of the bail amount waiting for the remainder to be paid (see Id., p. 
24) “as a condition of further release” as asserted by Respondent’s Brief at p. 4.  Respondent cites 
no statute or case law where partial bail payments are held by the county “as a condition of further 
release” when bail is increased by the Court; especially when the specific statute, IDAHO CODE § 
19-2912, requires exoneration. 
 The posted bail of $240,000.00 should have been revoked, exonerated, and returned to 
Appellant pursuant to the applicable statutes of the Idaho Bail Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2901 et 
seq., and I.C.R. 46 (i) and (j) (2016 version) while Mr. Gibson remained in custody until he came 
up with the increased bail amount of $340,000.00.  This was not done and this was error as 
asserted in Appellant’s Brief, p. 24. 
B. Appellant Has Not Argued Issues Beyond the Application of IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2919(1) 
and 19-2908. 
 
1. No New Theories Have Been Raised on Appeal; Only an Explanation of the 
Required Processes That Were Not Completed Under the Idaho Bail Act Which 
Started with IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1). 
 
 Respondent’s main argument is that the arguments in Appellant’s Brief: 
are based on theories not presented to the court below, and are thus not preserved 
for appellate review.  Review of the only preserved issue, whether Luis was 
entitled to recover the cash bond under I.C. § 19-2919(1) or whether it could be 
applied to the fine, costs and restitution under I.C. § 19-2908, shows no error by 
the district court. 
 
Respondent’s Brief, p. 5; see also all arguments in Part B at pp. 5-6. 
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 It is well settled law in Idaho that: 
“This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”  “Issues 
not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will 
be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.  (“We 
have held generally that this court will not review issues not presented in the trial 
court, and that parties will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”). 
 
* * * 
 
We have long held that “[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories 
and arguments that were presented below.” 
 
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 In this matter Appellant is not raising any new theories or issues for the first time on appeal.  
All theories, issues, and arguments are based on what was argued before the District Court on the 
Motion for Release of Bond Money: that IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) was not followed and that 
the cash bond amount of $50,000.00 still held by Bingham County should be revoked, 
exonerated, and returned to Appellant as should have been done on or about December 14, 
2016. 
 The Idaho Bail Act, enacted in 2009, contains the applicable statutes regarding the setting 
of bail and what to do in various circumstances when the bail monies/sureties become at issue—
including when a Defendant violates the conditions of his release while out on bail as is the case 
in this matter.  No one statute within the Idaho Bail Act contains all of the requirements of what 
a Court may or must do regarding bail.  The statutes within the Idaho Bail Act must be read 
together to understand what must be done in a given circumstance regarding the bail monies.  
6 
I.C.R. 46 (2016 version in this matter) also sets out the rules for a Court to follow as it deals with 
matters regarding bail. 
 In this matter, it is argued that the District Court and Magistrate Court committed errors 
under the Idaho Bail Act when Mr. Gibson admitted to violating the conditions of his release on 
bail.  The requirements of what a Court may and must do when it is alleged that a Defendant has 
violated the conditions of his release on bail starts with IDAHO CODE § 19-2919 “Revocation of 
bail — Violation of conditions of release.”  All arguments made by Appellant as to the errors 
committed by the District Court and Magistrate Court start with § 19-2919(1), which is where a 
Court should start when a Defendant is alleged to have violated the conditions of his release 
on bail. 
 IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) starts a Court on the pathway of how to deal with the 
Defendant and the bond monies/sureties posted for him.  Other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act 
and I.C.R. 46 (specifically subsections (i) and (j) (2016 version in this matter)), guide a Court 
as it makes its decisions under § 19-2919(1) so that all actions and processes are properly done 
with regard to the bond monies/sureties posted for the Defendant.  The requirements 
contained within the other applicable statutes of the Idaho Bail Act along with I.C.R. 46 (i) 
and (j) must be followed or the process is not completed; which is what happened in this matter. 
 Appellant’s Brief explains the errors made by the District Court and Magistrate Court 
under § 19-2919(1), which started the ball rolling to the other errors by these Courts by not 
following the requirements found in other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act, specifically §§ 19-
7 
2912, 19-2919(2), 19-2921, and 19-2922(6).  These arguments are not refuted by Respondent 
anywhere in Respondent’s Brief. 
a. Examples of Other Statutes Needed to Complete the Process Begun by § 19-
2919(1). 
 
 In Part D of Appellant’s Brief, pp. 23-24, Appellant argues that it was error for the District 
Court to not exonerate the previous bail amount of $240,000.00 when increasing the bail amount 
by an additional $100,000.00 in Bench Warrant 1.  § 19-2919(1) states that “At any time 
thereafter (the bail revocation hearing), the court may reset bail  in the same or a new amount 
and impose conditions of release.”  Assuming, arguendo, it is found under § 19-2919(1) that 
Bench Warrant 1 properly increased Mr. Gibson’s bail amount and the December 13, 2016, 
hearing was in fact a bail revocation hearing—and Appellant continues to assert that neither 
of these are true but rather errors under § 19-2919(1)—the assessment and actions of the Court 
does not stop there because § 19-2912—not § 19-2919(1)—directs what happens to the 
previously posted bail when bail is increased by the Court (emphasis added): 
After a defendant has been admitted to bail, the court in which the charge is 
pending may, upon good cause shown, increase or reduce the amount of bail.  
If the amount is increased, the court shall order the defendant to be committed 
to the actual custody of the sheriff until bail is posted in the increased amount.  
Any previous bail posted in the case shall be exonerated by the court.   If the 
defendant applies for a reduction of the amount of bail, notice of the application 
shall be served upon the attorney for the state and the person posting bail within 
five (5) business days. 
 
 “Any previous bail posted in the case shall be exonerated by the court.”  § 19-2912  Even 
though it is a different statute discussing bail, it now becomes a requirement of what the Court 
must do as a result of what it did by increasing the bail amount under § 19-2919(1). 
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 The same happens with § 19-2922, “The court shall order the bail exonerated in the 
following circumstances: . . . (6) The court has revoked bail and has ordered that the defendant 
be recommitted.”  Respondent admits that “[i]n this case Gibson’s bail was revoked, because 
he was remanded to the custody of the sheriff.”  Respondent’s Brief, p. 9.  Respondent, 
holding to the position that only § 19-2919(1) is preserved on appeal, therefore admits that Mr. 
Gibson’s bail was revoked and he was remanded to custody pursuant to § 19-2919(1). 
 However, revoking a Defendant’s bail and remanding him to custody of the sheriff under 
§ 19-2919(1) is not the end of the process.  Other required processes and actions must take 
place and those are found in other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act.  In this case, § 19-2922(6), 
which requires that bail shall be exonerated when “[t]he court has revoked bail and has ordered 
that the defendant be recommitted.” 
 The above examples are not new theories on appeal that was not raised below, but rather 
explanations that § 19-2919(1) now has additional requirements found in other statutes that 
must be followed based on what the Court did through § 19-2919(1).  The path of action was 
started by § 19-2919(1), requires additional actions found in other Idaho Bail Act statutes in 
order to properly complete the process after a Defendant has been found to have willfully 
violated the conditions of his release on bail. 
 The same analysis can be made for the other statutes and Rules discussed in Appellant’s 
Brief that Respondent’s Brief, pp. 5-6, asserts are “new theories” on appeal that were not raised 
before the District Court on the Motion for Release of Bond Money. 
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b. Conclusion to Subpart 1. 
 
 A Court cannot stop part way on the path under the Idaho Bail Act.  It must follow 
through to the end regardless of what statute under the Act requires action.   Appellant has not 
raised any new theories or claims of error on appeal as asserted by Respondent in its Brief at pp. 
5-6.  Appellant’s Brief simply shows that the asserted errors by the District Court and Magistrate 
Court made under IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) led to further errors by failing to take actions that 
were required by other statutes in the Idaho Bail Act which complete the process regarding the 
bond monies posted on behalf of Mr. Gibson. 
 Respondent’s arguments in Part B fail and the Court should consider all of the arguments 
and analysis found within Appellant’s Brief. 
2. The Errors Under IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) Still Require Reversal and Remand to 
the District Court. 
 
 In the event it is held by this Court that only the provisions IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) are 
preserved on appeal because the other statutes and required actions cited in Appellant’s Brief 
were not raised before the District Court in the Motion for Release of Bond Money, errors 
within the provisions of § 19-2919(1) still occurred that require reversal of the District Court’s 
August 9, 2017, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money and remanding 
this matter back to the District Court with instructions to revoke, exonerate, and return the 
$50,000.00 cash bond amount posted by Appellant. 
 IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) states: 
Upon its own motion or upon a verified petition alleging that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of release, the court may issue a bench warrant 
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directing that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court for a bail 
revocation hearing, or the court may order the defendant to appear before the 
court at a time certain.  At the bail revocation hearing, if the court finds that the 
defendant willfully violated a condition of release and the defendant is present 
before the court, the court may revoke the bail and remand the defendant to the 
custody of the sheriff.  At any time thereafter, the court may reset bail in the 
same or a new amount and impose conditions of release. If the defendant fails 
to appear at the bail revocation hearing, the court shall issue a bench warrant for 
the defendant’s arrest. 
 
a. The First Sentence of IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1). 
 
 Regarding the first sentence of § 19-2919(1): 
Upon its own motion or upon a verified petition alleging that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of release, the court may issue a bench warrant 
directing that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court for a bail 
revocation hearing, or the court may order the defendant to appear before the 
court at a time certain. 
 
 The District Court did not file its own motion “alleging that the defendant willfully 
violated a condition of release”; so that part need not be considered.  A “verified petition”, 
however, was filed by the Bingham County Prosecuting Attorney on December 13, 2016, in 
the form of the Motion to Revoke Release and the accompanying Affidavit of Danyett 
Cloward.  R, pp. 184-188.  However, there is nothing within either the Motion or Affidavit 
“alleging that the defendant willfully violated a condition of release”.  There is only a 
statement that “[Mr. Gibson] signed an admit form on December 12, 2016 admitting to 
drinking alcohol on December 7, 2016 and admitted to using methamphetamine on December 
8, 2016.”  R, p. 187. 
 After receiving the “verified petition”, the District Court “may issue a bench warrant 
directing that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court for a bail revocation 
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hearing, or the court may order the defendant to appear before the court at a time certain.”   § 
19-2919(1).  In this matter, the District Court issued a Bench Warrant, but it did not contain 
language that Mr. Gibson “be arrested and brought before the court for a bail revocation 
hearing.”  The District Court did not issue an order that Mr. Gibson “appear before the court 
at a time certain.”  See Part B of Appellant’s Brief, pp. 15-17; see also R, pp. 191, 193. 
 From the facts of this matter, Mr. Gibson was arrested and brought before the 
Magistrate Court as directed by the District Court in the Bench Warrant.  There was no 
direction to the Magistrate Court that it hold a bail revocation hearing pursuant to § 19-2919(1) 
because the Bench Warrant failed to include such language. 
 The requirements of the first sentence of § 19-2919(1) were not met by the District 
Court after receiving the “verified petition” because the Bench Warrant did not direct that Mr. 
Gibson be brought before the Court for a bail revocation hearing as required by this section.   
This was error by the District Court.  Respondent did not refute or argue against this position 
in Respondent’s Brief. 
b. The Second Sentence of IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1). 
 
 Regarding the second sentence of § 19-2919(1), “At the bail revocation hearing, if the 
court finds that the defendant willfully violated a condition of release and the defendant is 
present before the court, the court may revoke the bail and remand the defendant to the custody 
of the sheriff.”  As argued in Part F of Appellant’s Brief, pp. 26-29, what occurred before the 
Magistrate Court on December 14, 2016, was not a bail revocation hearing pursuant to § 19-
2919(1). 
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 It was hardly a “hearing” at all—it was more the Magistrate Court just giving 
information to Mr. Gibson.  All that was discussed between the Magistrate Court and Mr. 
Gibson was the following: 
a. that the underlying bond amount of $240,000.00 was not being forfeited; 
b. that the $100,000.00 bond amount on the Bench Warrant was “on top of that” bond 
amount of $240,000.00 already posted by Appellant on Mr. Gibson’s behalf; 
c. that “there’s a $100,000 bond in - - on top of the other”, again, referring the 
$240,000.00 bond already posted on his behalf; and 
d. “there’s a new bond.” 
 
See Tr, pp. 3-4; see also R, p. 192.  Nothing about the Bench Warrant other than confirming that 
Mr. Gibson had seen it.  Tr, p. 4.  Nothing about alleged violations of the conditions of his release 
on bail.  Nothing by the Magistrate Court finding Mr. Gibson had “willfully violated a condition 
of release” pursuant to § 19-2919(1). 
 Even though the Magistrate Court did not find that Mr. Gibson had “willfully violated 
a condition of release” as required by the second sentence of § 19-2919(1) on December 14, 
2016, it still remanded Mr. Gibson to the custody of the Bingham County Sheriff’s Office 
where he stayed until his January 10, 2017, sentencing hearing before the District Court.  
Appellant contends that by remanding Mr. Gibson to custody of the sheriff mandates 
revocation of bail under § 19-2919(1). 
 Either bail is revoked and the Defendant is remanded to custody of the sheriff, or bail 
is not revoked and the Defendant is released from custody on the original bail amount already 
posted.  There are no other options under the second sentence of § 19-2919(1) if a Defendant 
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is found to have “willfully violated a condition of release.”  See Part C of Appellant’s Brief, 
pp. 18-19. 
 The requirements of the second sentence of § 19-2919(1) were not met by the 
Magistrate Court at the December 14, 2016, “hearing” when it met with Mr. Gibson.  No bail 
revocation hearing was held.  No finding by the Magistrate Court of a willful violation by Mr. 
Gibson of a condition of his release.  No revocation of bail—although Respondent’s Brief at 
p. 9 asserts that Mr. Gibson’s bail was revoked.  The only provision of this sentence that was 
followed by the Magistrate Court was that Mr. Gibson was remanded to the custody of the 
Bingham County Sheriff’s Office. 
 Respondent does not refute or argue against this position in Respondent’s Brief.  
c. The Third and Fourth Sentences of IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1). 
 
 Regarding the third sentence of § 19-2919(1) (parenthesis added), “At any time 
thereafter (after the bail revocation hearing), the court may reset bail in the same or a new 
amount and impose conditions of release.”  Here, the District Court reset bail to $340,000.00 
before the alleged bail revocation hearing by inserting it in the December 13, 2016, Bench 
Warrant 1.  See R, p. 191.  The Magistrate Court also did not reset bail on or after the 
December 14, 2016, “hearing”.  It only advised Mr. Gibson that the District Court had 
increased the bail amount by $100,000.00 “on top of” the already posted $240,000.00.  See 
Tr, pp. 3-4, R, p. 192. 
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 The provisions of the third sentence of § 19-2919(1) are not met because the bail was 
not properly reset by the District Court or the Magistrate Court.  Respondent does not refute 
or argue against this position in Respondent’s Brief. 
 The fourth sentence of § 19-2919(1) is not applicable to this matter because Mr. Gibson 
did not fail to appear at the bail revocation hearing.  He was already in custody of the Bingham 
County Sheriff’s Office at the time of the December 14, 2016, “hearing” before the Magistrate 
Court—which Appellant continues to argue was not a bail revocation hearing required under 
§ 19-2919(1). 
d. Conclusion to Subpart 2. 
 
 All of the above shows several errors by the District Court and Magistrate Court in 
December 2016, regarding the provisions and requirements found in IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1).  
These errors are explained in more detail in Appellant’s Brief.  None of these errors were refuted 
by Respondent in Respondent’s Brief or argued to show why the District Court or Magistrate Court 
did not err. 
 Because of these errors this Court should reverse the District Court’s August 9, 2017, Order 
Denying Defendant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money and remand this matter back to the 
District Court with instructions: 1) to revoke and exonerate the $50,000.00 cash bond amount 
posted by Appellant pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2912, 19-2919(1)-(2), 19-2922(6), and I.C.R. 
46(i) (2016 version); and 2) to return said monies back to Appellant as should have been done on 
or about December 14, 2016. 
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3. What Happens Next? 
 
 The errors by the District Court and Magistrate Court under IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) 
leave the matter unresolved regarding the posted bond monies.  There are no actions or processes 
within § 19-2919(1) regarding what to do with the bond monies posted on Mr. Gibson’s behalf 
after he was remanded to custody of the sheriff other than revoking the bail.  The process 
regarding bail is not complete. 
 The questions which must be asked are, “what happens next?” and “what does a Court 
do regarding the bail posted on behalf of a Defendant after the provisions and processes of § 
19-2919(1) have taken place?”  If we stay only within the language of § 19-2919(1), these 
questions cannot be answered and we are left with an unresolved situation. 
 This is where the other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act and the applicable parts of I.C.R. 46 
(2016 version) come into play—not as “new theories” or arguments not raised to the District Court 
as asserted by Respondent, but to explain what has to happen to complete the process regarding 
bail when decisions have been made under § 19-2919(1).  We have to look at these other statutes 
in the Idaho Bail Act and the applicable Rules to see how to finish things because § 19-2919(1) 
does not provide the manner in which to complete the process regarding bail. 
a. Another Example of Other Statutes Needed to Complete the Process Begun by 
§ 19-2919(1). 
 
 Respondent’s Brief at p. 9 states that “Gibson’s bail was revoked, because he was 
remanded to the custody of the sheriff.”  Since the term “revocation of bail” is not defined in § 
19-2919(1), we must look elsewhere in the Idaho Bail Act for a definition to know what that 
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term means and what a Court must do.  This is found at IDAHO CODE § 19-2905(16), 
“‘Revocation of bail’ means an order by the court revoking the defendant’s release on bail.”  
 If we follow Respondent’s assertion that Mr. Gibson’s bail was revoked “because he was 
remanded to the custody of the sheriff” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 9), and if the definition of 
“revocation of bail” found at § 19-2905(16) includes “an order by the court revoking the 
defendant’s release on bail”, then where is this required Order Revoking Bail by either the 
Magistrate Court or District Court in this matter?  There is none found in the Record.  Neither 
the Bench Warrant (R, pp. 191, 193) nor the December 14, 2016, Minute Entry (R, p. 192) 
qualify as an Order Revoking Bail.  It is obvious we need more than what § 19-2919(1) 
provides to complete this process and properly deal with the bond monies posted on behalf of 
Mr. Gibson. 
 The requirements for such an Order Revoking Bail are found in § 19-2919(2) (emphasis 
added), “In its order revoking bail, the court shall recite generally the facts upon which 
revocation of bail is founded and order that the defendant be recommitted to the custody of 
the sheriff of the county where the action is pending to be detained until legally released.”  
There is no Order Revoking Bail on or after December 14, 2016, when, as Respondent asserts, 
Mr. Gibson’s bail was revoked. 
 After defining “revocation of bail”, and then seeing the requirements of what goes into 
an Order Revoking Bail, we then have to ask “what happens next” after a Court has ordered a 
Defendant’s bail revoked and ordered recommitment of Defendant to custody of the sheriff 
under the provisions of § 19-2919(1)?  “The court shall order the bail exonerated” pursuant 
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to § 19-2922(6).  What does the term “exonerated” mean under the Idaho Bail Act?  We then 
must go to § 19-2905(8) for the definition.  “‘Exoneration’ means a court order directing the 
full or partial release and discharge from liability of the surety underwriting a bail bond or the 
person posting a cash deposit or a property bond.” 
 Another order is required from the Court exonerating all or part of the cash or property 
bond posted by Appellant on behalf of Mr. Gibson.  We do not have any Order Exonerating Bail 
required by § 19-2905(8) from either the District Court or Magistrate Court on or after December 
14, 2016, after Mr. Gibson was committed to the custody of the sheriff.  Again, neither the Bench 
Warrant (R, pp. 191, 193) nor the December 14, 2016, Minute Entry (R, p. 192) qualify as an 
Order Exonerating Bail. 
b. Conclusion to Subpart 3. 
 
 All of the applicable statutes under the Idaho Bail Act work together to bring a Court to 
the proper end of the process regarding bail that was started by deciding what to do with a 
Defendant under § 19-2919(1) because § 19-2919(1) does not have everything necessary to 
complete the process regarding bail.  All required actions that must take place on this pathway 
after revoking a Defendant’s bail and committing him to the custody of the sheriff under § 19-
2919(1) lead to the mandatory exoneration of the previously-posted bail; which is found in 
other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act. 
4. Conclusion to Part B. 
 
 As shown above, these new requirements—not new theories or new claims not argued to 
the District Court—come into the process and must be followed after a Court decides what action 
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to take under the provisions of § 19-2919(1).  There is no order revoking his bail as required by 
§ 19-2905(16), with the required language required by §§ 19-2919(2) and 19-2921.  There is 
no order exonerating the previously posted bail required by § 19-2905(8), either due to the 
revocation of bail and commitment to custody of the sheriff under § 19-2922(6) or due to the 
increase of the bail amount by the District Court under § 19-2912.  There is no order 
committing Mr. Gibson to custody of the sheriff and exonerating the previously-posted bail as 
required by § 19-2912 when the District Court increased the bail amount.  All we have is Mr. 
Gibson in the custody of the Bingham County Sheriff’s Office from December 13, 2016, to 
January 10, 2017, and Bingham County still holding onto the bond monies posted on his behalf 
by Appellant. 
 As argued in the Appellant’s Brief and above, these new requirements were not 
followed by the District Court or the Magistrate Court in December 2016, after Mr. Gibson 
admitted to violating the conditions of his release on bail and after these Courts supposedly 
took action under § 19-2919(1).  The failure to follow the provisions of § 19-2919(1) and 
these new required actions was error.  Respondent does not refute or argue against any of 
these positions in Respondent’s Brief. 
 The provisions of § 19-2919(1) were not followed.  The required orders and actions 
found in other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act that come into the process after the decisions made 
under § 19-2919(1) were not followed.  The end result is nonetheless clear: the bond monies 
posted by Appellant should have been revoked and exonerated by the required orders from the 
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District Court or Magistrate Court on or about December 14, 2016, and those monies then 
returned to Appellant.  This was not done. 
 Unrefuted errors by the District Court or Magistrate Court started under § 19-2919(1) 
and followed to the other required actions because such actions were not taken pursuant to the 
other statutes as argued here and in Appellant’s Brief.  This Court should reverse the District 
Court’s August 9, 2017, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money and 
remand this matter back to the District Court with instructions: 1) to revoke and exonerate the 
$50,000.00 cash bond amount posted by Appellant pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2912, 19-
2919(1)-(2), 19-2922(6), and I.C.R. 46(i) (2016 version); and 2) to return said monies back to 
Appellant as should have been done on or about December 14, 2016. 
C. Standard of Review. 
 
 Respondent’s Brief at p. 6 briefly states the standard that statutory construction questions 
are subject to free review by this Court.  Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-15 states the same standard 
therefore and will not be discussed further in this Reply Brief as the parties agree on the applicable 
standard of review.  The statutes in the Idaho Bail Act are unambiguous and should be given their 
“plain, obvious and rational meaning” (Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada Cty. Bd. Of Equalization, 157 
Idaho 180, 184, 335 P.3d 25, 29 (2014)), starting with § 19-2919(1) and moving through the other 
statutes addressed in Appellant’s Brief and above. 
D. IDAHO CODE § 19-2908 Does Not Apply in this Matter. 
 
 The arguments raised in Appellant’s Brief and above regarding the errors made by the 
District Court and Magistrate Court led to the subject $50,000.00 cash bond monies posted by 
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Appellant for Mr. Gibson remaining “on deposit” with Bingham County at the time of Mr. 
Gibson’s sentencing on January 10, 2017, and subsequent entering of the Judgment of Conviction 
– Order of Commitment filed on January 12, 2017.  See R, pp. 220-223.  These circumstances 
were error and had all actions and processes been properly followed as argued by Appellant the 
$50,000.00 cash bond monies would not have been held by Bingham County at the time of Mr. 
Gibson’s sentencing in January 2017.  Therefore, § 19-2908 would not have any application in 
this matter because there would have been no cash monies “on deposit at the time of the judgment.” 
 The arguments found in Part I. D. of Respondent’s Brief, pp. 6-9, set out a dangerous line 
of reasoning with inequitable and undesirable consequences.  Put bluntly, Respondent asserts that 
if there is cash bond money “which remain[s] on deposit at the time of the judgment” (p. 7), then 
these monies must be used by the Court Clerk pursuant to the mandates of IDAHO CODE § 19-2908.  
Respondent basically asserts that it does not matter why the cash bond monies “remain[] on deposit 
at the time of judgment”, the fact that there are cash bond monies still with the county is all that 
matters. 
 Respondent ignores the fact that there are reasons for having cash bond monies still on 
deposit at the time of judgment which, if properly explored, would lead to the conclusion that the 
monies should have been revoked, exonerated, and returned before the judgment is entered but for 
some reason were not.  All that matters to Respondent is that there are cash bond monies “on 
deposit at the time of the judgment”, which means that they shall be used pursuant to § 19-2908. 
 As argued in Respondent’s Brief at pp. 6-9, the fact is that the $50,000.00 cash bond monies 
posted by Appellant were still with Bingham County when Mr. Gibson was sentenced.  Those 
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monies must be used under § 19-2908 because “The cash bond was on deposit with the court and 
therefore applicable to the fine, costs and restitution in the judgment.”  Respondent’s Brief, p. 9. 
1. Hypothetical Examples Where Cash Bond Monies Might Remain “On Deposit at the Time 
of the Judgment”. 
 
 Similar circumstances under other scenarios within the Idaho Bail Act may also lead to 
cash bond monies remaining “on deposit at the time of the judgment” which, as here, should not 
have been with the county but rather revoked, exonerated and not available for use under § 19-
2908. 
a. Hypothetical 1—Increasing Bail Under IDAHO CODE § 19-2912. 
 
 A Defendant is out on $100,000.00 bail posted by a cash bond.  The Court, upon good 
cause shown, increases Defendant’s bail amount to $500,00.00 one (1) week before sentencing.  
Pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 19-2912, by proper Order of Commitment and Order Exonerating Bail 
from the Court are filed.  The Defendant is recommitted to the custody of the sheriff and the 
previous bail posted is being exonerated.  Unfortunately, the processing of the bail exoneration 
takes longer than anticipated and the $100,000.00 remains on deposit with the county at the time 
of the Defendant’s sentencing and subsequent entry of the Judgment of Conviction.  Fines, fees, 
costs, and restitution total over $250,000.00. 
 Under this hypothetical scenario, the cash bond monies “remain[ed] on deposit at the time 
of the judgment”.  § 19-2908.  Following Respondent’s line of reasoning, despite the fact that the 
cash bond money was ordered exonerated but took longer to process and return to Defendant (or 
to whomever posted it on his behalf), the money must be used to pay the fines, fees, costs, and 
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restitution under § 19-2908.  Period.  No discussion.  No understanding that the money should 
not have been with the county when the Defendant was sentenced.  The money is “on deposit at 
the time of the judgment”—it cannot be returned to Defendant as it should have but must be used 
pursuant to § 19-2908. 
b. Hypothetical 2—Intentional Holding of Cash Bond Monies Until After Judgment 
is Entered. 
 
 Although very unlikely, this hypothetical proves the point that Respondent’s reasoning and 
argument of strict compliance within the plain meaning of § 19-2908 when there are cash bond 
monies “remain[ing]on deposit at the time of the judgment” (Id.)—regardless of the reason they 
remain on deposit—is dangerous and lead to inequitable results. 
 A Defendant is out on $25,000.00 bail posted by a cash bond.  Regardless of why bail 
should be exonerated under the Idaho Bail Act, it is ordered by the Court that bail be exonerated.  
The county clerk responsible for exonerating the bail is sympathetic to the victims of Defendant’s 
actions and wants to see them recover something by way of restitution.  The clerk intentionally 
keeps the cash bond monies “on deposit” until after the Judgment of Conviction is filed with a 
restitution order so.  Following Respondent’s reasoning, “The cash bond was on deposit with the 
court and therefore applicable to the fine, costs and restitution in the judgment” under § 19-2908 
and the victims would be able receive whatever restitution is ordered by the Court. 
 Again, Respondent’s argument is that because the cash bond monies were “on deposit” 
they must be used for those § 19-2908 factors regardless of why they were still “on deposit at the 
time of the judgment.”  Id. 
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2. IDAHO CODE § 19-2908 Would Not Apply in these Hypotheticals and Should Not Apply in 
this Matter. 
 
 It goes without saying that in the above hypothetical scenarios the posted cash bond monies 
should not have never been “on deposit at the time of the judgment” and therefore subject to the 
mandatory uses found in § 19-2908.  Upon reasonable inquiry it would be easily found that while 
the cash bond monies did remain with the county at the time the judgment was entered against the 
Defendants in these hypotheticals, the monies were still there because of unforeseen errors (or 
intentionally held) when, in reality, they should have never been “on deposit at the time of the 
judgment.”  Id.  The cash bond monies in these hypotheticals should be properly revoked, 
exonerated, and rightfully returned to the Defendant (or to whomever posted the cash bond monies) 
rather than be used to pay the fines, fees, costs, and restitution mandated by § 19-2908 as asserted 
by Respondent.  Any Court would see that is the equitable result of these unfortunate but very 
probable scenarios. 
 It is simple and reasonable logic.  The monies should not have been with the county but 
they were when judgment was entered.  The monies should be returned rather than be used subject 
to § 19-2908.  Respondent’s logic is dangerous and inequitable.  Although unambiguous and 
being read with its “plain, obvious and rational meaning” (Idaho Youth Ranch, supra), the outcome 
must be different because of the underlying facts leading to the cash bond monies remaining with 
the county at the time of the judgment. 
 It is the same with this matter.  As discussed at p. 35 of Appellant’s Brief, because the 
$50,000.00 cash bond amount should have been revoked and exonerated on December 14, 2016, 
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those monies should have never been with Bingham County at the time of Mr. Gibson’s sentencing 
on January 10, 2017, and the filing of the Judgment of Conviction – Order of Commitment on 
January 12, 2017.  Just like the above hypotheticals, the cash bond monies in this case were still 
“on deposit at the time of the judgment” because of errors that, upon reasonable inquiry, can be 
identified and rectified and the monies properly returned Appellant as if they did not “remain on 
deposit at the time of the judgment” (§ 19-2908) in January 2017. 
3. Conclusion to Part D. 
 
 IDAHO CODE § 19-2908 does not apply in this matter.  But for the errors of the District 
Court and Magistrate Court in December 2016, there would have been no cash bond monies with 
Bingham County to apply to fees, fines, costs, and restitution pursuant to § 19-2908.  Had all of 
the proper actions and procedures taken place in the District Court and Magistrate Court—as 
discussed in Appellant’s Brief and above—the $50,000.00 cash bond amount would have been 
revoked, exonerated, and returned to Appellant long before Mr. Gibson was sentenced and 
judgment entered against him. 
 Respondent’s logic that if cash bond money is “on deposit at the time of the judgment” 
then § 19-2908 applies no matter the reason the monies are still with the county is dangerous and 
will lead to inequitable and unintended consequences as shown above and in this matter.  This 
Court is strongly urged to not follow such logic and reasoning. 
 It was error for the District Court to hold that § 19-2908 applied in this matter and to deny 
the Motion for Release of Bond Money.  This Court should reverse the District Court’s August 
9, 2017, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money and remand this matter 
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back to the District Court with instructions: 1) to revoke and exonerate the $50,000.00 cash bond 
amount posted by Appellant pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2912, 19-2919(1)-(2), 19-2922(6), 
and I.C.R. 46(i) (2016 version); and 2) to return said monies back to Appellant as should have 
been done on or about December 14, 2016. 
E. Conclusion to Section I. 
 
 No new theories or claims have been raised on appeal by Appellant.  Additional actions 
in other statutes of the Idaho Bail Act are required once the decisions are made under IDAHO CODE 
§ 19-2919(1).  In addition to the errors made by the District Court and Magistrate Court under the 
provisions of § 19-2919(1), additional errors were made when the additional required actions as 
discussed in Appellant’s Brief and above were also not taken after Mr. Gibson’s bail was revoked 
(Respondent’s Brief, p. 9) and he was remanded to the custody of the Bingham County Sheriff’s 
Office. 
 None of these arguments made in Appellant’s Brief or above were refuted or opposed in 
any way within Respondent’s Brief.  IDAHO CODE § 19-2908 does not apply in this case based on 
the errors made by the District Court and Magistrate Court in December 2016.  The cash bond 
monies posted should have never been with Bingham County when judgment was entered against 
Mr. Gibson in January 2017.  Therefore, there is no application to § 19-2908 because, in reality, 
there was no cash bond monies to apply under this statute. 
 Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s August 9, 2017, 
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money and remand this matter back to 
the District Court with instructions: 1) to revoke and exonerate the $50,000.00 cash bond amount 
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posted by Appellant pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2912, 19-2919(1)-(2), 19-2922(6), and I.C.R. 
46(i) (2016 version); and 2) to return said monies back to Appellant as should have been done on 
or about December 14, 2016. 
II. Appellant is Entitled to Recover Her Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
 
 Respondent asserts the arguments on pp. 37-39 of Appellant’s Brief (Part J) regarding 
attorney’s fees on appeal are frivolous because Appellant seeks her fees under IDAHO CODE § 12-
117(1), which does not apply to criminal appeals.  See Respondent’s Brief, pp. 9-11.  As will be 
shown below, the action before the District Court and this appeal to recover the cash bond monies 
is allowed under § 12-117(1) for purposes of attorney’s fees and costs and should be awarded to 
Appellant on appeal. 
 IDAHO CODE § 12-117(1) states (emphasis added): 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse 
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency, 
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
 
 The arguments at pp. 9-11 of Respondent’s Brief are based on the pre-2012 version of § 
12-117(1), in which attorney’s fees were allowed for administrative proceedings or civil judicial 
proceedings only.  See 2010 Bound Volume for Titles 7-13, Idaho Code, p. 659.  In 2012, § 12-
117(1) was amended to delete the words “administrative proceeding or civil judicial” so as to make 
it applicable to any proceeding—administrative, civil, or criminal—involving state agencies or 
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political subdivisions and persons.  See 2017 Cumulative Pocket Supplement for Titles 7-13, 
Idaho Code, pp. 147-148. 
 IDAHO CODE § 12-117(5) states in pertinent part: 
For purposes of this section: 
(a) “Person” means any individual, partnership, limited liability partnership, 
corporation, limited liability company, association or any other private 
organization; 
(b) “Political subdivision” means a city, a county, any taxing district or a health 
district; 
 
 As it relates to Appellant’s Motion for Release of Bond Money (R, pp. 260-261) and this 
appeal, it is a proceeding for the recovery of cash bond monies paid by Appellant, a “person”, 
against Bingham County, a “political subdivision” that is holding said monies.  Whether this 
matter is a civil action (Appellant appealed this matter pursuant to I.A.R. 11(a)(1) for civil actions 
(see Notice of Appeal, R, p. 285) and paid the civil action filing fee of $129.00 pursuant to Civil 
Fee Category L. 4. and I.A.R. 23(c)(1) for this appeal (see Clerk’s Certificate on Appeal, p. 2)), or 
a criminal action is not relevant to the fact that § 12-117(1) applies to award reasonable attorney’s 
fees and “other reasonable expenses” to the prevailing party of “any proceeding involving as 
adverse parties . . . a political subdivision and a person” if the Court “finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”  Id. 
 Respondent’s only argument in Respondent’s Brief on the issue of attorney’s fees is that § 
12-117(1) does not apply.  See pp. 9-11.  Arguments made in Respondent’s Brief on this issue 
are frivolous by citing an outdated version of § 12-117(1).  By these frivolous arguments 
Respondent has “acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”  Id. 
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 Respondent does not refute any of the arguments made in Appellant’s Brief at pp. 37-39 
that Bingham County, through the Bingham County Prosecuting Attorney, “acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law when it opposed the Motion for Release of Bond Money.”  Id., p. 
37.  Those arguments remain valid and show the Bingham County Prosecuting Attorney’s 
unreasonable actions by opposing the Motion for Release of Bond Money at the August 8, 2017, 
hearing.  Respondent has failed to show how those actions and arguments of the Prosecuting 
Attorney at the hearing were of “a reasonable basis in fact or law”.  § 12-117(1). 
 Based on the unrefuted arguments made in Part J of Appellant’s Brief, pp. 37-39, Appellant 
should be awarded her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 12-117(1) 
and I.A.R. 35(a)(5) 40(a), and 41(a) as the prevailing party on appeal because Bingham County, 
through the Bingham County Prosecuting Attorney, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law 
when it opposed the Motion for Release of Bond Money and argued its position to the District 
Court on August 8, 2017, as well as by Respondent’s frivolous arguments made in Respondent’s 
Brief on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
 As argued in Appellant’s Brief and in this Reply Brief, several errors occurred by both the 
District Court and Magistrate Court on December 13-14, 2016, with regard to the bond monies 
posted by Appellant on Dillon Grant Gibson’s behalf after he admitted violating the conditions of 
his release on bail.  These errors came as a result of the District Court and Magistrate Court not 
following the provisions of IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1) and the requirements found in the other 
applicable statutes under the Idaho Bail Act and the applicable parts of I.C.R. 46 (2016 version). 
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 Because of these errors, the subject bond monies posted by Appellant were not revoked 
and exonerated as they should have been after Mr. Gibson was remanded to the custody of the 
Bingham County Sheriff’s Office.  These monies remained with Bingham County until Mr. 
Gibson was sentenced on January 10, 2017. 
 No new theories or arguments were raised on appeal that were not argued before the 
District Court.  Appellant’s Brief merely explained the additional required actions that a Court 
must do under the Idaho Bail Act after deciding what to do with a Defendant that is found to have 
willfully violated the conditions of his release on bail pursuant IDAHO CODE § 19-2919(1); 
specifically, when revoking one’s bail by remanding him to custody of the County Sheriff as was 
the case in this matter with Mr. Gibson. 
 None of those required actions under the Idaho Bail Act were taken by the District Court 
or the Magistrate Court in December 2016, which led to the cash and property bond monies posted 
for Mr. Gibson being held until his sentencing in January 2017.  Under the Idaho Bail Act those 
monies had to be exonerated by the Courts and returned to Appellant in December 2016 but were 
not.  IDAHO CODE § 19-2908 also is not applicable in this matter as the cash bond monies should 
not have been with Bingham County in January 2017, but for the assigned errors of the District 
Court and Magistrate Court. 
 Respondent refutes none of the above arguments and none that are in Appellant’s Brief.  
Respondent attempts to rely on technical positions that have no merit as well as outdated statutory 
language to refute the issues on appeal.  There are no arguments, cited case law, or other positions 
taken by Respondent that show the District Court did not err in denying the Motion for Release of 
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Bond Money on August 8-9, 2017 (see Tr, pp. 48-51; see also R, pp. 276-279), which denial is a 
culmination of all of the other errors committed in December 2016. 
 As requested in Appellant’s Brief and this Reply Brief, Appellant respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the District Court’s August 9, 2017, Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for 
Release of Bond Money and remand this matter back to the District Court with instructions: 1) to 
revoke and exonerate the $50,000.00 cash bond amount posted by Appellant pursuant to IDAHO 
CODE §§ 19-2912, 19-2919(1)-(2), 19-2922(6), and I.C.R. 46(i) (2016 version); and 2) to return 
said monies back to Appellant as should have been done on December 14, 2016. 
 Appellant also respectfully requests that this Court award her reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs related to this appeal. 
DATED this 2nd day of April 2018. 
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